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Summary 
This report deals with the tensions that the ‘second social contract’ – the relations be-
tween society, government, and the armed forces – has increasingly been confronted with 
in the context of military deployment. 
Since the times of John Locke, the idea of a social contract has served as the basis for 
democratic government. Modern democracies have additionally accepted a second, 
largely unwritten, social contract; one which regulates the unique relations between soci-
ety, government and the armed forces, including the mutual obligations arising from 
them: Soldiers place the interests of the nation before their own, subordinate themselves 
to the control of political authority, and relinquish some of their essential basic rights; 
they are forced to make personal sacrifices or even to give their own lives for the fulfil-
ment of their service. In return, soldiers must be able to rely on politics and society to 
treat them fairly, furnish them with needed equipment and supply them with necessary 
provisions. Above all else, soldiers should expect to be deployed only on missions whose 
chances for success remain within the boundaries of rational human judgment. 
The ‘second social contract’ necessitates that soldiers of democratic nations serve as 
citizens in uniform rather than pawns on a chessboard. It is their right to be deployed 
only after utmost care and consideration has been granted the issue at hand and all con-
cerns have been weighed. The standards for deployment justification cannot be anything 
other than high. 
This report makes a contribution to the public debate on the changes in global security 
conditions since the end of the Cold War – which have been much discussed but not suf-
ficiently analyzed. Though foreign military deployment has assumed a permanent posi-
tion within current security agendas, the resulting implications of such developments 
have not been duly reflected upon in their entirety. Deployment decisions are, in practice, 
not given sufficient due diligence, which has brought about a risk of growing estrange-
ment between society, government and the armed forces. The adhesive element that binds 
the military to society cannot merely consist of institutional democratic checks on the 
armed forces, but must also include processes of inter-societal trust-building and partner-
ship. This also rests upon a civil society that takes an interest in the destinies of its sol-
diers. 
Based on the empirical evidence, it can be observed that German military deployment 
in the Balkans in the 1990s and in Afghanistan starting in 2001 were not ‘wars of neces-
sity’ or self-defence, rather ‘wars of choice’ – parliament and the government could have 
easily decided against either of the respective deployments. This development has made it 
all the more necessary to reach decisions with utmost care.  
The newly initiated military structure reform of the German Bundeswehr has broad-
ened the scope of German military intervention, in accommodation to NATO’s New Stra-
tegic Concept. This policy has set the implementation of the values represented by the 
Alliance – also in the form of ‘humanitarian intervention’ – equal in status to the goal of 
 II 
collective defence. However, a thorough scrutiny into the logic of such deployments has 
not been carried out on the basis of previous experience. 
The complexity characterizing these new sorts of mission (peace keeping, peace build-
ing, humanitarian intervention), as well as the sheer increase in the number of deploy-
ments since the end of the Cold War have brought with them revised requirements for 
the profile of the soldiers. Members of the armed forces are now expected to possess the 
highest cognitive, intellectual and psychological abilities; they are required to be equally 
competent in peace keeping as they are in fighting wars. Democracies have responded to 
this altered deployment profile by progressively professionalizing their armed forces. This 
trend has ushered in new challenges for civil-military relations. They can be overcome, 
but demand careful handling, such as in the area of recruitment. 
Democratic decision-makers have to be able to deal with the growing risks related to 
new forms of military deployment; on the one hand, they have to justify the ‘wars of 
choice’ to their citizens and must approach military deployments with a certain degree of 
scepticism – though not complete refusal – and react to personnel losses with even greater 
scepticism. On the other hand, the ‘second social contract’ as well as the conscience of 
decision-makers themselves call for response strategies. Policy-makers have found two 
solutions to this problem, one being military risk-minimization, and the other being psy-
chological and rhetorical repression. But neither solution is sufficient, on account of the 
fact that the problems are either deferred or repressed rather than solved. In order to pre-
vent estrangement between society, government and the armed forces, decisions on mili-
tary deployment must be more thoroughly and carefully considered. The military option 
should truly be the measure of last resort and not simply presented as such through rheto-
ric. In a case of doubt, it may very well be advisable to say ‘no’ to a deployment, even in 
the face of criticism from one’s allies. 
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1.  Introduction: democracy, the armed forces and military 
deployment: a problematic relationship1 
Since the time of John Locke, the foundation for democratic theory has been the ‘social 
contract’. This relates to the agreement among the citizenry to install a government that is 
both dependent on the citizens’ electoral decisions and representative of their interests. 
Elected representatives create laws that all citizens are subject to, with the overarching 
goal of creating societal peace by means of a constitution in accordance with the rule of 
law.  
An unwritten ‘second social contract’ likewise exists in democratic states. This con-
tract aims at the inward ‘taming’ of the military and additionally requires that the social 
community and its leaders recognize the fact that soldiers assume certain sacrifices ac-
cording to the demands of their service, therefore requiring both the social community 
and its leaders to adhere to a special obligation of due diligence in regards to decisions 
affecting their soldiers. This ‘second social contract’ is thus of paramount importance for 
a healthy relationship between democratic society and the military. 
A change in conditions brought about by the end of the Cold War has led to a read-
justment of these mutual obligations: more has been demanded of the soldiers, as they 
have been required to fulfil higher performance standards and often accept increased 
service risks. The gains that should be evident on the other side of the equation – a subse-
quent performance increase on the part of policy-makers and society – should be nothing 
other than a more assiduous adherence to obligations of due diligence. However, as the 
current diagnosis illustrates, in light of readjustment in strategic goal-setting and new 
mission types, the equation has not been balanced. The fact that deployed soldiers often 
complain about insufficient equipment supplies is further proof that policy-makers are 
faced with an obligation to act. 
Government policy now takes for granted that foreign troop deployments are a part of 
the military’s daily agenda: NATO’s New Strategic Concept, according to Article V of the 
Washington agreement, strengthens the coexistence of traditional Alliance defence and 
global missions that serve Alliance security, and, beyond that, further the goal of the im-
plementation of NATO-defined values in the form of ‘humanitarian intervention’ – in 
extreme cases the prevention of genocide. Both aims often end up converging – such as in 
the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan: NATO ‘puts its foot down’ 
where its security interests are either directly or indirectly affected, and, concurrently, it 
spreads the liberal-democratic values that characterize the constitutions of its member 
states.   
 
 
1 We would like to thank Carsten Rauch and Bruno Schoch for their helpful commentary and remarks. 
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The underlying concept behind the current restructuring of the German military – be-
gun by the then Defence Minister zu Guttenberg and initially met with strong opposition 
before eventually being concluded – also accommodated the goals of this double mission 
from the beginning. In the future, the German military is meant to have the capacity to 
simultaneously maintain two contingents of soldiers of up to 5,000 personnel each in 
deployments abroad. This translates to an extension of the military’s intervention capa-
bilities, revealing the positions of the political parties in parliament (with the exception of 
Die Linke – the leftist party), which set out to adjust the role of the German military, away 
from mere national defence within the nation’s borders and towards a concept of an 
‘army in deployment’, far away from the homeland. 
Self-defence and foreign assistance, in the mainstream discourses of liberal democra-
cies, are understood to be either self-evident or high moral goals (Wheeler 2000). On the 
abstract and theoretical plane of military structural blueprints and strategic concepts, this 
idea presents itself well, making it difficult for anyone to take up a convincing counter-
position. Problems do, however, emerge once one reads the fine print and the concept is 
actually applied: the tension-filled relations between democracies and wars as well as be-
tween democracies and their militaries come to a fore, representing two volatile and mu-
tually-connected political and moral issues. It would be convenient to simply debate them 
within the realm of political ethics philosophy; in reality, however, these issues manifest 
themselves as concrete and pressing decision necessities, such as in January 2011 in rela-
tion to the decision to extend the deployment mandate of the German military in Af-
ghanistan. 
The first issue, ‘democracy and war’, brings up the question of when and to what ends 
democracies should be allowed to wage wars. Various deployments of the German mili-
tary have managed to combine the moral goals of foreign aid and self-defence, but this 
has owed more to political rhetoric than to the realities of the situations themselves. The 
war in the Balkans was indeed burdening German society with a rising number of refu-
gees. Nonetheless, this was not a security issue as such, especially when one considers the 
strength and stability of German society and the economy. The threat of escalation across 
Europe, ignited by the conflict in the Balkans, was likewise implausible – this was no 
longer the world as it was in 1914, and the most serious tensions with Russia resulting 
from the war first materialized after NATO intervention and were not inherent in the 
initial conflict itself. In a similar vein, it is also hardly reasonable to assume that Ger-
many’s national security is being defended in Afghanistan (see below). 
These considerations show that the aforementioned troop deployments were not ne-
cessities in terms of self defence or defence of the Allies. They were carried out because 
the goals were deemed ‘good’ and the chances for success high. A decision against de-
ployment could just as easily have been reached if careful consideration had led to a dif-
ferent assessment of the conditions. These examples thus represent instances of ‘wars of 
choice’ rather than ‘wars of necessity’ (Freedman 2005, 2006). The parliament and gov-
ernment enjoy a degree of liberty in decision-making in such ‘wars of choice’, which they 
can utilize in various ways. This does, however, require that standards of diligence are 
carefully followed for the sake of those who will go on to shoulder the burden of deploy-
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ment decisions, namely the soldiers and the people affected in the deployment areas. This 
leads to the second political and moral issue: ‘democracy and the armed forces’. 
Democratic government, particularly Germany’s, wishes for its ‘citizens in uniform’ to 
be both civilized and democratic creations. Democracies also wish for them to prove ef-
fective and strong in the fight for national security and the political ‘good’. Soldiers are 
expected to be citizens, armed helpers, and professional fighters all in one. The fact that 
these requirements are riddled with tension, when not outright contradictory, is seldom 
articulated – certainly not in white papers, or other military structure papers or strategic 
concepts. 
The primary purpose of this report is to deliver a contribution to the, up to now, non-
existent debate on the tensions understood to be exist within the ‘second social contract’ 
in the context of troop deployment decisions in ‘wars of choice’. The basis of the reports 
rests, firstly, on the fact that German armed forces are subject to deployment primarily on 
account of a mandate from the United Nations, stipulating military involvement either in 
the interest of the international community (manifested in the United Nations), or when 
the survival of a people faced with genocide is in question or grave crimes against human-
ity have been uncovered. Secondly, the report assumes that these deployments are never 
limited to ‘social work’, but that soldiers are in every case faced with the possibility of 
combat involvement. Thirdly, the report seeks to map out the mission tasks in all their 
complexity, as well as risks associated with their completion. Fourthly, it aims to stress the 
obligations carried by society and political leadership in relation to their soldiers. And 
fifthly, the report assumes that a flourishing relationship between democracy and its sol-
diers is by no means a minor criterion for democracy, but rather a fundamental require-
ment: Should the situation go awry, the very survival of the democratic polity would be 
thrown into doubt. This would not necessarily translate to the (unlikely) possibility of a 
military coup within the democracy (though it has happened), but rather to the onset of 
an underlying alienation, which could undermine the loyalty of the soldiers and make 
populist political alternatives more attractive. Even the very beginnings of such a devel-
opment must be resolutely combated. 
The report first presents the ‘Military Covenant’ model that was developed in Great 
Britain. It applies – be it written or unwritten – to democratic society, government and 
the armed forces, and defines the institutional arrangements that guarantee the upholding 
of a democratic system. Following this, the changes evident in the global environment 
and among the contracts to which democratic armed forces have been bound since the 
end of the Cold War will be identified. 
With this background, the report will then move on to discuss the military reforms be-
ing observed all across Europe, including their new sets of goals and the changes in con-
ceptions of ideal democratic soldiers that have been a result. Following this, light will be 
shed on how democracies are handling moral problem they are being confronted with, 
which is also a problem of policy presentation to the public: namely, putting soldiers in 
danger despite the absence of irrefutable necessity. Both technical as well as psychologi-
cal/rhetorical solutions have been utilized in the problem-solving process; however, due 
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to the increased demands set by the ‘second social contract’, these responses have proven 
insufficient. Though this report takes the German situation as its basis, the experiences of 
other democracies will also be addressed in order to ensure broader grounding for the 
findings and conclusions laid out here.2  
2.  Democracy and its armed forces: the ‘second social contract’ 
The idea of a ‘second social contract’ (here also referred to as ‘covenant’) between society, 
government and the armed forces has been in development in Great Britain for many 
years. The covenant dates back in spirit to 1593 when Elisabeth I issued a statute that pro-
vided taxes on parishes for the treatment of wounded soldiers. In April 2000, the British 
army, with the approval of the government, published the Military Covenant in order to 
counter the growing gap between British society and its armed forces.  
During the course of British involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Covenant has 
proven itself quite popular: media, opposition, former defence leaders, charities and aca-
demia refer to the government and society’s obligation to act with diligence and care – as 
set out in the Covenant – when criticizing the negative aspects of military involvement – 
such as the considerable overextension of the armed forces, equipment shortages and the 
lack of (medical) care.3 The new government coalition of conservatives and liberals has 
promised to renew and formalize the Covenant, aiming to better facilitate the fulfilment 
of society’s obligations to its own military (MoD 2010: 29). 
The Covenant rests on the ‘unbreakable bond’ of common identity, loyalty and respon-
sibility, which sustained the army for centuries. This is a very fitting description of the rela-
tionship between society, democratic government and military. Soldiers take a special posi-
tion in this relationship being that they forego some of their basic rights through their 
choice of career and must be prepared to sacrifice their lives for the common good when 
the elected political leaders deem it necessary. Additionally, they are required to refrain 
 
 
2 This report draws upon the results of three large research projects conducted by PRIF within its program 
“Antinomies of Democratic Peace”. “Kriege von Demokratien nach 1990” (Wars by Democracies after 
1990, funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) investigated the decision-making processes in 
seven Western democracies in favour or against participation in military operations. “Democracies and 
the ‘Revolution of Military Affairs’” studied the integration of new technologies within the armed forces 
of six democracies and one non-democracy. “The Image of the Democratic Soldier” (sponsored by the 
Volkswagen Foundation) examined the shift in the conception of the soldier in twelve democracies, in-
cluding six younger democratic systems in Eastern Europe. We also draw upon the results of the large-n 
study “Parliamentary Control of Military Missions in Western Democracies”, a DSF-sponsored project. 
These projects, aimed at fundamental research, each attempted to comprehend the occurrences in our 
own country, utilizing empirical comparison with other countries.  
3  See, for example, Forster 2006, 2011; Harding/Borland 2007; Judd et al. 2007; Rayment 2007; Military 
Covenant Commission 2008; Tipping 2008. 
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from using their own violence potential for political aims and to place the interests of 
state and society before their own. It is for this reason that the ‘second social contract’ 
requires society to act in turn and accordingly recognize and value the military profession 
as a part of the democratic system. It also requires political leadership to demonstrate a 
high degree of care for the soldiers, imploring leaders to refrain from imprudent or arbi-
trary deployment of the military for reasons of political opportunism. Interestingly, Carl 
von Clausewitz (Clausewitz 1969, third book, fourth chapter) groups the three actors of 
the ‘triad’ – government, military, and people – together accordingly, stating that their 
harmonious co-existence constitutes the defensive strength of a nation, while disharmony 
and conflict between them brings about defeat. For the relationship between a democracy 
and its military, the commitment to this (mostly unwritten) contract is an essential pre-
condition in order to maintain of support, or at least toleration, of military deployment 
from the citizens. 
For democracies, soldiers are not simply disposable elements of the state apparatus. As 
the reformers of the German armed forces in the 1950s clearly stated, soldiers are ‘citizens 
in uniform’, a status that is also implicit in most other democracies – and in comparison 
to past ages, this is a significant advance for civilization. Soldiers now have the right to 
expect that all considerations be thought through and weighed out when the decision falls 
on whether to expose them to physical and mortal dangers and, furthermore, place them 
in mentally and physically demanding situations in which they must choose between kill-
ing or being killed in a split second. Citizens of democracies are not pacifists by default; 
they hold the deployment of the armed forces as correct or even unavoidable in certain 
circumstances. With this comes the demand for convincing justification. 
Considering this, the citizenries of Western democracies react notably stronger to 
losses on their side, particularly when the war at hand is neither in self-defence – a ‘war of 
necessity’ – nor when, in their view, national interests are not clearly being served. In 
other words, the more a conflict is viewed as a ‘war of choice’ and the more public opin-
ion believes non-involvement to be the preferable alternative, the more sensitized the 
public becomes to losses. Apart for the type of involvement, another essential question is 
the extent to which the mission goals originally set out by political leadership are being 
met over the course of time. Losses become an especially potent issue when the original 
mission goals begin to overshoot their previously-defined time-frames or when no ad-
vances are apparent (Larson 1996; Gelpi et al. 2006). Casualties are given greater value the 
greater the feeling of their futility. In the West, the public eye has been practicing an ever 
more critical assessment of why their own soldiers are risking their lives. Accordingly, the 
willingness to accept casualties is especially low in cases of abstract wars for world order 
or humanitarian intervention. Initially, it would be feasible to assume that a readiness to 
accept losses for causes such as genocide prevention is present within a population. If, 
however, enemy parties cannot be kept separated and further massacres cannot be endur-
ingly avoided after the initial intervention, public consent can, even after a handful of 
additional losses, quickly disintegrate. For political decision-makers, there always exists 
the danger that losses will lead public opinion to turn in regards to military involvement 
thus placing the government under pressure. This is supported by the fact that the degree 
of political unity on the topic of troop withdrawal is taken by the populace as an indicator 
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for the political significance of a mission. Troop deployments that enjoy cross-party sup-
port must, based on this line of reasoning, be in the nation’s interest and are thus judged 
accordingly. Experience has also shown that additional personnel losses can lead to the 
break up of cross-party consensus, especially when the added factor of increasingly un-
clear goals is added. In such a situation, the government will find it extremely difficult to 
justify further losses and it could be confronted with the danger of the ‘victim trap’: For 
the sake of avoiding further losses, progressively more limits are placed on soldiers until, 
eventually, they are hardly even allowed to leave their encampments. Since the soldiers 
are no longer able to act, the mission goal becomes increasingly unattainable, leading 
tolerance for losses to further decrease, and so on and so forth. 
Up to this point, we have only spoken about losses on one side of the front. On ac-
count of global mass media, the West has been forced to reconcile military demands with 
its own moral standards when waging wars. This manifests itself in increased public con-
cern for civilian victims – often trivialized as collateral damage. Recent studies show that 
Western states place altogether more value on protecting civilian populations than do 
non-democratic states. Despite this, current studies also indicate that supporters of mili-
tary deployments – and presumably Western societies on the whole – still adhere to a 
clear hierarchy of norms, which places the protection of one’s own soldiers above that of 
foreign civilians (Geis et al. 2010; Shaw 2005). The best-known example of this was during 
the war in Kosovo, as NATO pilots were ordered not to fly below a certain altitude in 
order to protect themselves from Serbian air defences. An accepted consequence was the 
decreased accuracy of the attacks and a corresponding increase in the likelihood of civil-
ian casualties. The American military now proclaims the protection of its soldiers to be a 
mission goal in and of itself, equal in standing to the actual mission goals themselves. To 
put it emphatically: Only once the protection of one’s own troops has been guaranteed, 
can other goals – such as the prevention of genocide – be addressed. The public’s contri-
bution to the ‘second social contract’ is fulfilled, almost instinctively, through its stance on 
the minimization of risks facing its soldiers and, in certain cases, through the rejection of 
non-convincing military deployments. With this, the discussion can return to the rela-
tionship between democratic rule and the armed forces. 
3.  Democratic checks on the military and deployment decisions 
In order to ensure a healthy relationship between a democracy and its military, two crite-
ria must be fulfilled: The institution comprising the armed forces, along with its capacity 
for inner-societal utilization of force, must, firstly, be tamed as well as be frictionlessly and 
dependably integrated into the democratic system – the military apparatus may not be 
allowed to exist as a ‘state within a state’. Secondly, being that this situation is rather 
tenuous, precautions must also be taken in order to ensure that future military deploy-
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ment is executed prudently and responsibly. Otherwise, the democracy runs the risk of 
estranging the state (or society) from its armed forces.  
Democracies – including Germany’s – have not let the contents of their ‘second social 
contracts’ simply remain unwritten agreements. Rather, they have initiated two sorts of 
institutional measures – one in constitutional form and one in the form of basic laws – 
that are meant to ensure that both contractual parties adhere to their mutual obligations. 
One of these includes the provisions that regulate civil control over the armed forces. The 
other deals with procedural provisions that address the decision making process of de-
ployment, especially when for purposes other than national defence. 
3.1  Democratic checks on the military 
One particular characteristic of the inner relationship between a democracy and its mili-
tary, from a structural point-of-view, is the requirement of civil checks on military power: 
security and military decisions fall under the scope of legitimated democratic leadership. 
This is the basic principle of democratic government (Schmidt 2000: 450f), anchored in 
the constitutions as well as political practice of established democracies – e.g. as found in 
the Basic Law of Germany (Grundgesetz) and in its Soldier Law (Soldatengesetz). This is 
likewise an essential principle for states undergoing the democratization process. Analo-
gous institutional reforms were undertaken during the wave of democratization that fol-
lowed in the wake of the collapse of Communism beginning in 1989/1990. Moreover, 
democratic integration and checks on the armed forces require more than just institu-
tional structures. The qualitative feature of democratic states is the principle, based on a 
trust in society, that the volonté générale and the military are integrated in a deliberative 
process of negotiation. The path such a process traverses and its ultimate results are 
closely intertwined with the history of a nation, its political culture, its institutional order 
and further factors relating to its concrete democratic development. This can be seen in 
the varying – and changing – beliefs on whether general compulsory military service, the 
militia or the professional armed forces create a military force that corresponds to the 
state’s form of government. 
An assessment of the broad range of military reforms shows that neither armies 
formed by compulsory military service nor ones composed of voluntary personnel can 
claim to be (more) democratic options per se. The relationship between society and the 
armed forces in various states, as well as their respective everyday realities, are much more 
decisive in this assessment, indicating whether or not integration has been successful or if 
the armed forces function as, or are turning into, a democratically-damaging agent. The 
issue related to the ‘second social contract’ therefore does not find its solution in any par-
ticular military structure (see Mannitz 2012). 
On account of the existence of various types of civil-military relationships in the de-
mocracies of today, one is led to the conclusion that the search for broadly applicable 
criteria for the creation of a military structure appropriate to democracies is futile. Issues 
of adaptation and other dilemmas facing young democracies require one to also take the 
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context of change into account (Schiff 2009). Purely institutional analyses ignore the his-
torical and cultural prerequisites for the formation of successful civil-military relation-
ships. Furthermore, a functioning institutional arrangement remains dependent on a 
process of deliberative democracy; a critical public eye, the media and non-governmental 
organizations are also imperative alongside institutional control mechanisms. This does 
not, however, imply that a lack of inclusive debate automatically brings about the es-
trangement of the military from the foundations of a democratic society. In order to cur-
tail the violence potential of the armed forces as well as military adventurism on the side 
of political leadership, a form of democratic checks is needed, one that operates beyond 
the purely operative level of institutional mechanisms and embraces the processes of in-
ner-societal trust-building and the formation of partnerships. 
The dire need for an all-encompassing concept of democratic checks on the armed 
forces – one also accepted by the latter within democratic society – is especially apparent 
in post-socialist states. This is by no means limited to young democracies, and even Ger-
many has to deal with this issue. The general disinterest of civil society in regards to mili-
tary matters is existent in post-socialist democracies and, based on our findings, also in 
older ones (Mannitz 2012). An ironic conclusion surfaces in relation to the fundamental 
need for democratic checks on the military: Rather than playing the role of the beast that 
needs to be kept in check by means of an institutional cage, it is the military itself that has 
the greatest interest in the maintenance of a system of democratic control. This is, in all 
likelihood, the only way to ensure that reckless, poorly-consulted, high-risk, overly-costly 
and unnecessary operations are avoided. However, as we have observed in several West-
ern democracies since 1990, the realities of democratic checks have not been in accor-
dance with their ideals: shortened decision processes; lacking degrees of transparency; 
claimed, but unproven claims to ‘all other options being exhausted’; ‘obligations to the 
Alliance’; deception; stubborn political elites that deploy troops either despite opposing 
public opinion polls or behind the backs of their disinterested constituencies – all of these 
examples point to the opposite of democratic decision-making process ideals. Just as we 
request it of our democratic soldiers, so too do the soldiers wish that we operate democ-
ratically. It would be to the disadvantage of all should the populace and political elite not 
respect this wish. 
3.2  Democratic checks on deployment decisions 
The decision of whether or not to deploy a country’s soldiers – be it for reasons of defence 
or other assignments – is one of the weightiest decisions that a democratic government 
has to make. It is for good reason that the majority of democratic states have put constitu-
tional regulations in place in order to restrict the liberties granted the executive in this 
decision making process. Of note here is that such restrictions are found to be far lower in 
older democracies with imperial pasts. Both the French president and the British prime 
minister exercise practically limitless authority over the deployment of their armed forces, 
their parliaments merely left with indirect control over the budget. Similarly, the presi-
dent of the United States is granted unilateral power to deploy troops for a limited period 
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of time (60 days) before Congress is allowed to issue a veto. Considering America’s ability 
to achieve fast operational victories against the conventional unions of most of its oppo-
nents, this freedom of discretion is very far-reaching. Countries like Germany can be 
found at the other end of the spectrum, where the laws delegate power solely to the par-
liament in matters of military deployments outside of the country’s borders, likewise plac-
ing parliamentary hurdles in the way of declarations of self-defence. Most of the younger, 
second and third wave democracies in Europe tend to operate closer to the German side 
of the spectrum than to the British and French (Wagner 2010; Peters/Wagner 2010). 
This sort of constitutional limit is the most crucial in hindering executive capricious-
ness in matters of troop deployment. Admittedly, an unwritten convention has increas-
ingly been observed in which governments that are not bound to the consent of their par-
liaments are finding it prudent to seek the concurrence of their legislatures nonetheless. 
This owes to the fact that democratic governments are placed under high pressure for 
justification when sending their soldiers into battle (Geis et al. 2010). Despite the absence 
of constitutional necessity, President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair gathered votes 
from their respective legislatures (with positive results) prior to the war in Iraq in 2003. 
Furthermore, democratic governments are under pressure to develop comprehensive 
public justification narratives; appeals to national honour, glory or imperial expansion 
not longer suffice. These times are over: as one conservative strategy expert from America 
put it, we live in a post-heroic age (Luttwak 1996). The citizens of democracies are not 
moved by the idea of giving up their lives any longer, even for the glory of the fatherland, 
nor do they expect it of their fellow citizens in uniform. Decisions to go to war are met 
with pronounced critical public scrutiny, admittedly more so in some democracies than 
in others. It is in part for this reason that the war balance sheet among democracies varies 
so greatly, ranging from ‘very often’ to ‘never’ (Müller 2004: 495f; Human Security Centre 
2005: 26). Decisive for this variation is, among other factors, a country’s traditions, which 
translate into particular cultures of national security policies (Geis et al. 2010).  
The increasing internationalization of military operations has the tendency to level 
these differences: Obligations to act are created – or simply claimed – , easing the burden 
on executive leadership and permitting them, with appeals to international obligations or 
even for the sake of ‘sustaining of the Alliance’, to be less exacting when weighing the pros 
and cons. When the deployment obligations of a country’s armed forces are extended 
beyond the borders of national or Alliance defence to include the goal of universal com-
mon good – such as with the idea of ‘responsibility to protect’, which has ultimately been 
accepted by the United Nations (Brock 2007) – , conceptions of the soldier are, in turn, 
fundamentally altered. From this currently observable trend up to the ever-increasing 
fusion of civil and military roles comprising a soldier’s range of tasks, proponents justify 
foreign military involvement of supposed ‘non-military’ operations with appeals to the 
ethical standards of a civilized world community. They attempt to establish legitimacy for 
the numerous unconventional military operations since the end of the Cold War – from 
peacekeeping to ‘humanitarian intervention’ –, on the basis of arguments that would gen-
erally be respected by democratic governments. This includes the prevention of genocide, 
the protection of human rights against bloody tyrants, or the assistance of people in need. 
However, the task profiles of soldiers – as well as the relations between society and the 
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military – are greatly affected when armed forces are required to accept an increasing 
number such assignments based on international mandates. This shift in mission types is 
not by definition a disadvantage, yet it demands that democratic societies remain atten-
tive and develop clear criteria for the missions that they support (Schoch et al. 2007), as 
well as for those that they do not. 
Closer observation demonstrates that regulations binding a military to a democracy – 
as well as to the norms of the latter – are considerably more airtight than those obligating 
policy-makers to responsible handling of deployment decisions involving their armed 
forces. It is believed that this can happen in no other way. The binding of the armed 
forces to constitutional processes is permanent and remains independent of any special 
circumstances. Deployment decisions are, in contrast, always dependent on the situation 
at hand and must therefore be granted margin for discretion, which cannot be regulated a 
priori in all times and situations. The fulfilment of due diligence in regards to the armed 
forces is, in such cases, a factor of the quality of decision preparations. 
4.  The new challenges and changes facing democratic  
soldier profiles 
4.1  The transformation of the international system and new tasks  
for the armed forces 
The bipolar structure of the Cold War supported the binary and polarized way of thinking 
that had traditionally characterized military mentality. Once this conflict came to an end, 
the comfortable simplicity of this model ceased to exist: the enemies, missions, goals, 
strategies and doctrines, which had remained largely unquestioned for half a century, 
were suddenly obsolete. The world became complicated, even for the Western Allies, 
proven by their progressive divergence in options regarding very basic issues: Should 
NATO’s primary task continue be Allied territorial defence, or should the maintenance of 
global order be made the new focus? Should Russia be considered a potential threat or a 
potential partner? Could nuclear deterrence’s social bonding effect within the Alliance be 
replaced by means of missile defence systems or conventional deterrence, or is the issue 
simply obsolete (Dembinski/Müller 2010)? The agreements defining the Alliance increas-
ingly began to represent compromises rather than clear guidelines. 
Hardly anyone would contest that security policy considerations have demanded revi-
sion and expansion in response to the increasing degree of interdependence that has re-
sulted from globalization and transnationalization. Two of the repercussions have been 
the rise of trans-border terrorist network activities as well as indirect effects of state col-
lapses or violent conflicts abroad on our lifestyles, consumption and production habits at 
home. Notwithstanding, there is plenty of reason to doubt that the broadening of military 
deployment areas is, in most cases, the appropriate response to this process. New threats 
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are certainly no longer inter-state by nature, and the defence of Western values can now 
be interpreted as an indirect form of state defence: the continued legitimacy and function-
ing of democratic states rely on the maintenance of these values. Yet the democracies that 
have opted to extend the conception of security in their defence doctrines following the 
end of the Cold War are now faced with the problem of defining the criteria for legitimate 
troop deployment. This diffusion of threats within a rather borderless understanding of 
‘expanded security’ has made it difficult for soldiers to grasp what their profession pa-
rameters actually are, given the circumstances. 
The new assignments include, along with national defence, armed conflicts resulting 
from new policy goals at home, which have a definitive humanitarian character. Also 
present are ‘security missions’ – falling within the framework of ‘expanded security’ – that 
are rather freely defined and do not always abide by the dictates of accepted common 
sense. Soldiers are sent great distances to their deployment locales in order to establish 
and maintain freedom for others, some, or even many, of who are much less desirous of 
freedom than Western political decision-makers seem to assume. Rectification of mis-
judgement occurs either seldom, late or never. The “Progress Report” (“Forschungs-
bericht”) issued by the German military in December of 2010 regarding the war in Af-
ghanistan is, however, a notable step in right direction. 
For the deployed soldiers, the majority of these ‘out of area’ assignments include opera-
tions that are highly risky, even falling under the category of ‘freedom enforcement’, as they 
exist in a grey area between war and peace. Who one’s enemy actually is often remains un-
clear and the borders between ‘civilian’ and ‘combatant’ are regularly blurred as well. 
Stemming from this grey area problem is the issue of added stress, found to have be-
come far greater than the ‘normal’ burdens of conventional wars. The war on terror 
stands at the far end of the military assignment spectrum, defined as confrontation with a 
merciless enemy, who does not heed legal or moral limits. Deployments of this sort have 
begun to increasingly resemble conflicts with highly armed nation state enemies: outright 
combat situations against large enemy units are becoming ever more common. For as-
signments in the middle of the assignment spectrum, soldiers have to be prepared to con-
front enemy ‘freedom destroyers’, while at the same time protecting civilians. At the ‘soft’ 
end of the spectrum, soldiers are given civil tasks, such as providing for the basic needs of 
the civilians. Most assignments cover the entire spectrum, and specific tasks are, depend-
ing on the situation, prone to shift from one end of the pole to the other in a matter of 
seconds. Clear boundaries remain elusive, and, as a consequence, soldiers are constantly 
expected to perform along the entire assignment spectrum. Soldiers are required to ex-
hibit the highest levels of cognitive, intellectual and psychological competence: complete 
flexibility; precise and accurate situational assessment capacity under time pressure (“Is 
the approaching motor driver a civilian client or a terrorist?”); professional confidence in 
order to instil trust in the civilians and, at the same time, fear in the opponents; and a high 
willingness to accept risk: shooting first, asking questions later is not permitted, regardless 
if the situation calls for just such an action. 
The vague definitions of security found in defence doctrines present members of the 
armed forces with unclear deployment risks. The probability of a large war along a clearly 
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defined territorial front has disappeared. The new forms of military involvement are now 
characterized by immense complexity, bringing with them wholly new challenges for 
soldiers, as well as the entire military institution. Consequently, nearly all democracies 
have implemented military restructuring based on three criteria: size-reduction, profes-
sionalization, and technological modernization. Despite significant opposition within 
Germany’s two largest parties, restructuring reached the German military by 2010: The 
armed forces have to reorient themselves in accordance with the new challenges, and con-
scription has been repealed in favour of a volunteer structure. 
4.2  The transformation of the armed forces 
Developments in information and weapon technologies (see below) require high degrees 
of technical competence, skills which conscripts cannot attain during basic training (Ja-
nowitz 1971: xi; Moskos 2000: 15; Coté 2004). What’s more, the diverse challenges of 
security politics – arising from the internationalization of military forces – imply a need 
for professional troops with the corresponding training. Apart from considerations such 
as specialization and improved training quality, the ebb of territorial defence demands has 
been the leading factor behind restructuring towards professionalized armed forces. 
Today, military operations conducted by democratic states are multi-national enter-
prises, demanding highly qualified armed forces with experience in both inter-military 
and civil-military cooperation (Coté 2004; Haltiner/Klein 2004; Soeters/Manigart 2009). 
Above all, this calls for training in both military and non-military areas, weapon speciali-
zation and manoeuvre experience. Such standards can only be fulfilled by either soldiers 
with extended service times or soldiers who are voluntary and/or professional soldiers. 
Owing to these high qualification standards, the cost-benefit ratio has shifted in favour of 
smaller professional armies supported more and more by civil subcontractors (Moskos 
2000: 15f; Boëne/Callaghan/Dandeker 2004: 406). Factors that were once a hindrance to 
intervention by democratic societies – namely the rational judgment of the citizens, the 
interest in efficient use of resources, and sensitivity in regards to potential casualties of 
one’s own soldiers – take on new relevance with the introduction of voluntary profes-
sional forces: It’s more sensible, economically, to maintain a small(er) number of well-
trained professional soldiers, who can be counted on to accept missions, rather than con-
scripts. Nevertheless, the high costs of individual training could also increase the reserva-
tions about deploying professional soldiers. Furthermore, societies can only recruit a suf-
ficient number of volunteers with the necessary training background for leadership roles 
as long as the armed forces have not been consigned with (an overabundance) of risky 
deployments on account of political irresponsibility in the past. 
In order to get an idea of the specific requirements democracies have placed on the 
profiles of their soldiers following military restructuring, we analyzed white papers and 
training guidelines, and conducted interviews with officers and soldiers at their training 
centres – all within the ‘The Image of the Democratic Soldier’ research project (Mannitz 
2012). This data indicates that the soldier profiles created by European democracies in the 
21st century amount to a highly specialized combination of diverse virtues. Subordination 
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to democratic checks and withdrawal from political involvement can be seen as the sol-
dierly ‘citizen virtues’, reflecting the goal of institutional safeguards of civil checks on the 
military. General virtues, which could also be ascribed to civilians, include honesty, integ-
rity, diligence and dedication. The social virtues defining the profile are empathy, devo-
tion, solidarity and a sense of responsibility. Here we can see, in contradiction to old cli-
chés (Hentschel 2010: 44), that the contemporary soldier profile has drifted away from the 
traditional idea of a ‘macho hero’. The general professional virtues such as flexibility, dis-
cretion and ‘professionalism’ are identical to ones a civil employer would value. The 
genuine soldierly virtues include self-sacrifice, discipline, obedience, courage, a fighting 
spirit and comradely. 
These findings clearly show that the trend towards diversified sorts of extraterritorial 
intervention and crisis intervention has resulted in soldiers from democratic countries 
being required to fulfil a broader range of tasks, ranging from ones that were formerly 
relegated to civil humanitarian relief organizations all the way up to the execution of so-
called pre-emptive wars. They are expected to be equally capable in matters of peace keep-
ing as they are in battle. This increasingly complex conception of the soldier has altered 
the inner-democratic relationship between civilians and the military, has had an influence 
on soldier qualification profiles, and has created challenges in finding suitable personnel 
(Coker 2002; Seiffert 2005; Mannitz 2006, 2007 and 2011).  
Officers are expected to lead by example as well as be able to sympathize with their 
subordinates and treat them as individuals. They should be able to aptly explain complex 
situations so that their soldiers can fully grasp their given assignments. Furthermore, offi-
cers have to be capable of independently making decisions and executing mission type 
tactics, a requirement that – as a result of the new deployment scenarios – has clearly also 
been carried over to the armed forces, even though they were never acclimated with mis-
sion type tactics. Officers are supposed to possess management skills and be highly skilled 
in situational analysis. Strict military virtues are fused with the qualities of professional 
civil managers as well as talented social workers in the officer corps; this too no longer 
corresponds to the ‘macho-hero’ image of the past. In short, these idealized conceptions 
of soldiers and officers call for a high degree of cognitive aptitude and character strength, 
demands that reflect the ever more complex deployment environment awaiting the armed 
forces. Training regiments and assignment concepts have had to adjust to the new envi-
ronmental conditions at a break-neck pace. This leads us to a critical question: Are society 
and government overburdening the mental, psychological and social capacities of the 
men and women to whom they delegate these extremely difficult assignments? In other 
words, judged on the basis of what is humanly possible for the individual, is not nearly 
every military mission being transformed into a ‘mission impossible’? 
The institution of the armed forces has been forced to react to this professional up-
heaval accordingly – the result of new international challenges and politicians’ revised 
interpretations – and, additionally, to cope with significant socio-cultural changes. Trans-
formations that took place in the daily social realm during the last generation have 
reached the relatively secluded, but not completely insulated, social apparatus of the mili-
tary. Traditional military logic was oriented along binary categories such as friend and 
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foe, peace and war, political and military, domestic and foreign, civil and military, supe-
rior and subordinate, and male and female. Such binary thought structures can, of course, 
be refreshing in their simplicity, and can be psychologically comforting for a person 
whose profession presents him or her with the risks of injury and death. The most promi-
nent examples of erosions in this binary orientation today include ethnic and cultural 
diversity within the armed forces, the introduction of women in uniform, and – having 
now also reached the US – the right for homosexuals to be forthcoming about their sexual 
preferences. The two latter examples in particular constitute a challenge to male soldiers’ 
traditionally masculine orientation, in which a certain degree of machismo was ever pre-
sent. They have countered with broad questions relating to psychological stability. More-
over, they call attention to the fact that sexual tolerance and gender mainstreaming do not 
have long traditions within democratic societies but are, by and large, developments of 
the post-1968 liberal protest era. The military – formerly the most explicitly masculine 
domain in society – has thus been faced with especially heavy adjustment pressure in a 
very short period of time. This aspect should not be disregarded when attempting to real-
istically assess the demands placed on personnel serving in the armed forces. 
4.3  Consequences of the transformation on military-democracy relations 
The transformation of armed forces, being witnessed in democracies the world over, has 
been a consequence of the growing requisite for professionalization, the direct result of 
highly technological and social qualification requirements, increasingly complex missions 
and reduced personnel numbers. This poses a significant challenge to military institutions, 
which were used to dealing with continuous flows of recruits who possessed the necessary 
mixture of talent and skill. Due to the changed circumstances, special attention must be 
given to the ‘selection list’: It is to be avoided that poorly trained, violent and extreme right-
wing conservative young people account for a significant portion of the armed forces. Fur-
thermore, the abolition of mandatory military service runs the risk of expanding the gap 
between democratic society and the armed forces, a trend that has, however, been progress-
ing for some time now as the recruitment rate of able-bodied conscripts has sunken. In 
countries where the new military structure based on volunteers has been completed, public 
appreciation of the armed forces has generally not been negatively affected. 
As political and military tasks have become increasingly intertwined with one another 
as a result of unconventional military deployment scenarios, professional military elites 
have begun to take an active role in the creation of policy concepts. The fact that this 
trend is suppressing the primacy of civil normative power in everyday practice in democ-
racies may go on to have grave consequences. The debate among experts over civil-
military relations in democracies no longer considers this trend simply as an undesired 
development in principle, but rather understands it as an expression of professional dif-
ferentiation: Professional soldiers step in as competent advisors in matters of defence 
policy, often positioning themselves as defenders of democratic values and ideals. The 
impact assessment of this is, however, likewise ambivalent. Peter Feaver was correct in 
highlighting the face-off between “civilian hawks and military doves” in the US (Feaver 
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1995: 129f.), claiming that inadequate authority granted political decision-makers is one 
central problem in current civil-military power relations. This supports the theory that 
political leaders of democratic states, given certain circumstances, have greater incentives 
and fewer scruples when it comes to waging wars than members of the armed forces. And 
yet, there is also evidence to the contrary, showing that members of the armed forces 
demonstrate a greater willingness to actually use available instruments of violence than 
their civilian counterparts (Sechser 2004). Todd Sechser’s study comes to the conclusion 
that it is the institutional checks and practiced mechanisms of democratic control them-
selves that curb a democratic state’s tendency to intervene and also urge military leaders 
to maintain reserved positions. Such limits can cease to exist if the opportunity for public 
participation and attention to and/or interest in the public exercise of its check functions 
disappears in favour of a security policy of ‘expertocracy’ (Sechser 2004: 770f). 
The internationalization of security politics and the growing consequences on demo-
cratic sovereignty and transparency of military operation decisions resulting from this 
internationalization could have similar effects (see Wagner 2010). Military missions un-
der multi-national direction will, in all likelihood, gain in importance in the context of 
growing cooperation efforts, be it within NATO or the European Union’s Common For-
eign and Security Policy (CFSP). Even though democratic checks on the collective forces 
of violence are institutionally entrenched in each member nation, the exercise of these 
checks within democratic alliances is being jeopardized: Military operation decisions are 
made without the participation of national populaces while parliaments fall back on the 
irrefutable argument of the national ‘alliance capability’. Parliaments are thus relegated to 
serving a mere rubber-stamping function for decisions that are negotiated by executives 
on the supranational level (Wolf 2000). 
A lack of transparency in and accountability for policy decisions complicate effective 
democratic checks just as much as unclear security policy guidelines do: “How [do] we 
know when national survival is at stake in the absence of direct territorial attack?“ (Forster 
2006: 8f) The increased efforts at transnational integration in the areas of security and de-
fence policies also add another dimension to the problem: How should legitimacy, respon-
sibility and checks be organized if future soldiers, from their perspective, are to operate less 
for the sake of their national sovereign and more so as bearers and defenders of order for a 
transnational (European or world-) society? Increasing internationalization requires that 
conflicts are diligently monitored in order to make sure that the focus of military operations 
run by democratic countries continues to be on the civilizing of conflicts. It must be made 
certain that armed forces are not degraded to mere foreign policy instruments. Without 
consensus between society and the military on democratic principles and societal goals as 
well as mutual agreement that both sides share responsibility for the defence of the former 
two, the relationship between them is bound to become unstable. In such a case, the as-
sumption that democracies exhibit a high degree of responsibility in relation to their use of 
military resources would become little more than a pious wish. 
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5.  Policy answers to heightened deployment risks 
Democratic decision-makers are well aware of the heightened deployment risks related to 
new forms of military involvement and what these mean for the armed forces. The public 
in democratic states is ‘casualty sensitive’, meaning that they react to the losses of their 
own soldiers, especially in ‘wars of choice’, by withdrawing their consent; one can also rest 
assured that politicians understand rising numbers of fallen soldiers as a moral dilemma. 
They are therefore faced with a problem: They are forced to keep the public ‘in line’ and, 
at the same time, deal with their own burden of conscience. It can be observed that poli-
tics has developed two coping strategies for this: technical responses to the named risks 
on the one hand, and psychological and rhetorical repression on the other. 
5.1  Attempts at military risk minimization 
In the last twenty years, the armed forces have been confronted with rapid developments 
in military technologies, termed the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA). In so many 
words, the RMA refers to the replacement of soldiers with technology. The efficiency, 
range and accuracy of weapons, as well as the growing, IT-supported economics of 
weapon deployment, have allowed for operations to be carried out with considerably less 
combat personnel and often far away from the battlefield (Müller/Schörnig 2001).  
The RMA offers a vital solution to the appeasement of relations between society, poli-
tics and deployed armed forces. It can be interpreted as the core element of military policy 
strategy aimed at diverting or minimizing as many risks as possible away from one’s own 
soldiers, thereby addressing the discontent within society over fallen troops and also forti-
fying the ‘second social contract’ in the age of ‘wars of choice’. Risk diversion, or rather 
‘risk-transfer wars’ – so titled by Shaw (2005) – can assume various forms. In essence, it is 
conceivable to have dangerous combat operations performed by third parties. These third 
parties could, for instance, be composed of local groups who also stand in opposition to 
those in power. The Northern Alliance in Afghanistan serves as such an example: They 
receive air support from American special units but take on all the risks of ground opera-
tions themselves. Another option for diverting risk away from regular troops is the con-
tracting of private security services – private companies that provide the ‘temp’ services of 
normal army personnel with military backgrounds, and, depending on the situation, even 
engage in combat situations in the stead of national troops (Singer 2003). 4 
Both of the latter options do have considerable disadvantages – such as inadequate de-
pendability or legal problems arising from civilian soldiers participating in armed conflict. 
For this reason, the RMA alternative tends to be preferred by the Western states, utilizing 
 
 
4.  Studies have shown that in the USA, for example, the public hardly takes notice of casualties involving 
private security firms. Cf. Schooner 2008. 
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technology rather than outside troops in order to distance one’s own troops from the 
battlefield (e.g. through the use of precise rockets and cruise missiles), to reduce their 
visibility – and thereby their vulnerability – (e.g. with stealth bombers), or even to ex-
change them completely for technology, for instance with drones or robots. It is especially 
crucial that modern RMA armies network themselves more thoroughly, in order for all 
units to be connected into a dense information network and, in so doing, be able to re-
ceive a multitude of intelligence in real time. This measure ensures a significant informa-
tion advance over the enemy, entailing a marked increase in protection and virtually de-
nying the enemy the possibility of staging an ambush or surprise attack. 
If an RMA army makes full use of its technological superiority on all aforementioned 
levels, then even relatively highly rated opponents no longer present a real danger to the 
army’s troops – provided the enemy possesses weapons that are no more advanced than 
last-generation ones used by adversaries in Iraq or Yugoslavia. Whereas 148 American 
soldiers lost their lives during the Gulf War in 1991, only 138 perished up to the capture 
of Baghdad in 2003, despite the fact that the latter war was considerably more dangerous 
on account of its extensive ground operations. During the war in Kosovo, which was ex-
clusively an air offensive, not even one allied soldier died as the result of enemy action.5 
RMA armies bring with them the promise of ‘wars without bloodshed’ – for one’s own 
soldiers (Mandel 2004).  
As made evident by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the promises of the RMA are 
only applicable in very specific situations and scenarios. Though the West is now able to 
conduct traditional wars with very few casualties, this is not the case for ‘small wars’ 
fought against insurgents. Modern war jets and GPS-guided precision bombs have limited 
efficacy when opponents utilize guerrilla warfare and terror tactics. The greatest dangers 
facing Allied troops in Afghanistan and Iraq are now the improvised bombings and booby 
traps along roadways. The Western Allies have lost substantially more troops in the post-
war periods than they did during the military conquests of the respective countries them-
selves. Concurrently, political decision-makers and military planners are becoming in-
creasingly aware of the fact that harsh operations and the acceptance of civilian casualties 
drive more volunteers to the insurgency cause. 
Nonetheless, Western democracies continue to rely on technological solutions: It 
would seem, for instance, that the increased utilization of remote-controlled battle drones 
– armed, unmanned aircraft – has offered politicians an escape out of the quandary of 
constantly rising Allied, as well as foreign, casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq. The de-
ployment of unmanned systems, firstly, reduces one’s own losses, as allied soldiers are 
kept far away from the battlefield, and, secondly, human rights organizations confirm that 
the utilization of battle drones also results in relatively few civilian casualties – as long as 
low-powered explosives are employed and fixed flight routes are maintained during op-
eration (Human Rights Watch 2008: 2).  
 
 
5  As mentioned above, success was attained at the price of imprecise attacks and a resultantly higher proba-
bility of civilian casualties. 
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The RMA in general along with increased use of unmanned systems and battle drones 
have become the key instruments of warfare, and are writing the newest chapter in the 
history of humanity’s dream of waging nearly bloodless wars with guaranteed victory. 
This hope is, however, not all that new. Many of the past’s technological advancements 
initially created and fostered high-flung expectations, only to eventually end in bitter dis-
appointment, as subsequent wars were even bloodier than before and occasionally ended 
in defeat (Brodie/Brodie 1973). Even though one ought to know better, three distinct fac-
tors are presently converging in Western democracies, prompting a particular impulse 
towards high-tech armament: Western democracies command the technological capaci-
ties of their high-tech industries, they have a desire to achieve bloodless victories, and 
they are driven by the urge to do good in the world – to enforce what is right, to depose 
tyrants, to protect the oppressed, and to bring governmental and societal order to places 
where chaos reigns. The combination of these three elements – of good intentions and 
considerate means – is an especially dangerous illusion. In his time, Carl von Clausewitz 
recognized that innovations and technological advancement may alter the execution of 
wars, but they do not alter their essential character:  
“The necessity of fighting very soon led men to special inventions to turn the advantage in it 
in their own favour; in consequence of that the mode of fighting has undergone great altera-
tions; but in whatever way it is conducted its conception remains unaltered, and fighting is 
that which constitutes war.” (Clausewitz 1873, second book, first chapter) 
Wars remain what they are: violent clashes of two opposing political wills that do not 
want to succumb to the other. The experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan prove that supe-
rior technologies cannot alone create order or bring determined insurgents to surrender; 
technologies merely assist in the effort, at best. The proverbial ‘boots on the ground’ are 
required in order to accomplish these goals: infantry deployment on the surface, where 
the high risks facing soldiers and the populace in need of protection cannot be avoided. 
Armies, which have either fully integrated the RMA or are on their way to doing so, could 
encounter adjustment issues if delegated assignments with a ‘pedestrian’ character, espe-
cially in built up or rugged areas. In contrast, armed forces that are technologically behind 
are confronted with the problem of inter-operability during mutual deployments with 
RMA-equipped partners. They are prone to develop a ‘technological inferiority complex’ 
when comparing themselves to their ‘advanced’ fellow combatants. Such sentiment could 
transform itself into a feeling of resentment towards their own political leadership, who 
denied them access to comparable equipment. Evidence of such tendencies has been 
found in the case studies we conducted (Mannitz 2012). 
A glance at the fiscal side of things also reveals problems: Armies transitioning to 
RMA have to deal with considerable dilemmas in budget-making: They are forced to 
choose between real-world assignments, which fall into the category of ‘peace-building’ or 
‘stable peace-keeping’ and predominantly involve infantry deployment, and the high-tech 
pipe dreams stimulated by their encounters with better-equipped comrades. Consequen-
tially, governments and their parliaments are hardly in a position to shoulder both as-
signment-related and inter-operability-related requirements of their armed forces, as 
essential needs must also be satisfied in the civil sector.  
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States that attempt to copy the RMA, or at least parts of it, may have it easier. Many 
conflicts of recent years have shown that opponents cannot be kept from undergoing 
technological advancement forever. Israel has had to learn this the hard way through 
various drone attacks by Hamas, and the rapid race to catch-up in the area armament 
upgrades by Chinese engineers is another striking example of this fact. Imitators often 
find it easier to arm themselves in particular niches of modern weapon systems. They can 
copy functioning and proven technologies, thereby saving themselves the burden of the 
complex and cost-intensive process of trial and error that is an integral part of military 
research and development. From this perspective, one may venture to predict that, in the 
long-term, Western states may one day be faced with the financial troubles described 
above, leaving room for challengers to technologically surpass them.  
Western societies and their political decision-makers do well if they resolutely hold to 
the view that military violence is the option of last resort, also resisting the temptation of 
the lauded ‘bloodless’ weapon systems, and avoiding engagement in new arms races. Fi-
nally, the easily gained initial victory does not by any means signify a ‘mission accom-
plished’; one all too often finds oneself stuck in conflicts from which there are no clean 
ways out, while potential challengers catch up technologically. 
5.2  Repression and avoidance rhetoric 
If the RMA represents an attempt by democratic governments to address the ‘second so-
cial contract’ problem by technological means, another attempt includes the employment 
of psychological mechanisms, avoidance strategies and rhetorical efforts in order to in-
crease the acceptability of military involvement to both soldiers and the public. The tech-
nological attempt is utilized in the US and Great Britain, whereas the latter has found 
support most notably in German discourse, manifesting itself in three distinct strategies. 
The first of these strategies – one in a series of readily observable deployment methods 
– aims at participating in missions with other military contingents, albeit in such a way as 
to ostensibly keep one’s own soldiers out of harm’s way. In Cambodia, German troops 
served in a medical corps; in East Timor, they flew transport helicopters; in Somalia, they 
remained in Mogadishu, 400 km away from the battlefield; in Lebanon, only the navy was 
deployed; and in Afghanistan, German troops were responsible for the, supposedly, more 
peaceful northern part of the country, defending their comfortable position at all costs 
when army high command requested greater flexibility from them in order to support 
army units in other regions when requiring reinforcement in specific zones. All of these 
examples highlight a recurring pattern: an attempt to demonstrate solidarity with the 
Allied partners and respond to their calls for help, yet, at the same time, promote the idea 
at home (and probably even be convinced of it oneself) that any assistance would pre-
clude the possibility of considerable risk to the German troops involved. By this means, 
policy-makers attempt to reasonably satisfy the demands of both parties in the ‘second 
social contract’, namely the populace and the armed forces. But this approach is unten-
able: As the saying goes: “You can’t have your cake and eat it too.” 
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The second strategy involves declaring military involvement as a ‘matter of national 
defence’. Former Defence Minister Peter Struck took this approach when he made the 
claim that the German nation was being “defended at the Hindu Kush.” This statement 
was false from the very beginning, and, as reports by the German intelligence services 
later proved, the terror threat at home ended up actually increasing rather than disappear-
ing as a result. He may very well have been correct, but certainly not by appealing to na-
tional defence. The initial motive was to show solidarity with the US, whose forces were 
coming under attack from al-Qaeda and its supporters in the Afghani Taliban. This goal 
was, however, eventually overshadowed by the goal of establishing democracy in Afghani-
stan. Though not necessarily relevant to the initial aim,6 it was soon regarded as the primary 
goal nonetheless. As a result, even though the Struck Doctrine may have been a motivating 
factor for German soldiers at first, it was immediately met with scepticism from the public. 
Such scepticism was inevitably bound to grow even further, since a matter of national de-
fence should have led people to the realization that the German military had been sent into 
a combat situation. But precisely this realization stood in contradiction to the third strategy 
(directly corresponding to the avoidance strategy of alleged danger-free deployment situa-
tions), namely denying the characterization of military deployment as war involvement and 
defining the role of the armed forces as helpers, not combatants, instead.  
Following the tradition of foreign deployments of the German military, involvement in 
Afghanistan was also not defined as war. German troops were sent to a purportedly safe and 
low-risk area. This position, according to the promise, would help in maintaining the illu-
sion that German troops are indeed not involved in a war, but rather in humanitarian 
peace-keeping. For the sake of sustaining the denial of actual war involvement, this narra-
tive has, over the years, gained in breadth, producing ever more venturesome and creative 
wording such as “not war, but a resolute stabilizing operation in which combat situations 
repeatedly arise”. As a result, growing difficulties have surfaced. Images showing the after-
math of an air strike near Kunduz in the fall of 2009 disproved the narrative of war denial – 
the ‘not a war’ narrative was destroyed once and for all. There were too many dead bodies 
lying on the ground, the victims of a military deployment that could now be called noth-
ing other than a ‘war’, at least according to rational common understanding. It was only 
following this incident that the then German Defence Minister, zu Guttenberg, attempted 
to grant the images a realistic framework, which he then gradually asserted. This went on 
to confirm public suspicion that the actual risks confronting troops – as well as third par-
ties such as Afghani civilians – was in fact far greater than official discourse had led one to 
believe, causing a rise in the already perceptible pressure to come up with a concrete plan 
for withdrawal. 
 
 
6  See also the “Progress Report” (“Fortschrittsbericht”) issued by the German federal government (Bundes-
regierung 2010). 
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5.3  Democratic society and armed forces: a growing gap? 
How have the personally affected, namely the soldiers, reacted to this mixture of enor-
mously complex demands, transformation stress and political coping measures? Our find-
ings point to a remarkable imbalance, cutting across all examined countries, between the 
high regard society gives its armed forces on the one hand, and soldiers’ self-perception of 
this regard on the other, which they view to be exclusionary and insufficient. There also 
exists a curious contradiction in soldiers’ attitudes towards new assignments (the ‘wars of 
choice’): Many members of the armed forces agree, in principle, that such assignments are 
generally sensible. Nonetheless, though they do not of course refuse deployment, soldiers 
often express doubt in regards to the concrete missions themselves, in which they are put 
to the test. Concomitantly, they expect politicians to rigidly defend the missions in the 
face of growing public scepticism. This suggests a rather grave psychological and cogni-
tive dilemma. 
Growing scepticism towards this sort of military involvement has indeed developed 
among the Western public, threatening to bring with it a growing gap between the people, 
political leadership and the military, despite the fact that general public esteem for the 
latter of the three remains strong. This leads one to ponder the following: Carl von 
Clausewitz identified this cleavage as one of the determining factors of defeat, and the 
American experience in Vietnam supports this theory (Summers 1982). So what does this 
imply for NATO deployments of today? 
The complaints by soldiers interviewed in our research were nearly unanimous in re-
spect to crucial aspects of their deployments (lacking equipment, duration of deployment, 
insufficient attention to their concerns on the part of politicians, and so on). Ill-conceived 
missions are all the more dramatic for the soldiers involved, as, in addition to the mortal 
dangers, the fact that many of these assignments operate in a grey zone brings with it the 
added risk of legal prosecution with serious repercussions for a soldier’s future career and 
civilian life. The tension between the three partners – public, politics and armed forces – 
is in danger of intensifying. 
Demands placed on soldiers tend to have an absolute character. In contrast, political 
willingness to supply troops with the (actual or supposed) necessary means is relative 
(Bundestag 2010). This is even understandable to a degree, considering the similarly 
pressing financial needs from the civil sector at home. Nevertheless, considering the high 
risks that members of the armed forces are expected to confront, this is not an acceptable 
course of action with regards to the unwritten ‘second social contract’. 
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6.  Conclusions and recommendations 
‘Wars of choice’ increase the complexity of mental and operative demands on soldiers. 
On account of the ever present risks, these wars amplify the already considerable deploy-
ment stress, at a time when transformations in military structure, technology and organ-
izational culture are burdening the ‘citizens in uniform’ as it is. Furthermore, they lead to 
a shift in the relationship between soldiers, politicians and society. These deployments 
neither serve the defence nor the greatness of the nation (though this could well be an 
ulterior motive for some politicians), as did many military operations in some nations’ 
imperial pasts. They are either justified through a stretched, and therefore debatable, un-
derstanding of national security or they are said to serve the reestablishment of order, 
either regional or global, or moral aims, both of which require lengthy and invariably 
contested justification. All such deployments are contingent in nature: There may be good 
reasons for them, but there may also be good reasons against them. 
It is the right of those who agree to allow themselves to be sent into armed conflicts, 
thereby exposing themselves to mortal and physical danger, to demand that decisions 
regarding their deployment be made with utmost possible diligence and care. This re-
quires a thorough clarification of the following points: 
• A profound reason for deployment exists: national security is in grave danger; global 
stability is seriously on the line; the situation requiring intervention is progressing to-
wards genocide or extremely dire and prolonged human rights violations – not merely 
typical cases of heavy guerrilla warfare. 
• There are either no alternatives or no reasonable ones. The alternative of ‘keeping out 
of it’ is also reasonable, as long as the expected consequences of non-involvement are 
significantly less negative than those arising from involvement. 
• Intervention has a high chance of success. Even in the worst of scenarios, in which 
emotions cry for action, intervention is senseless if the issue is irresolvable. 
• When these three concerns are weighed against the potential risks facing involved 
soldiers, intervention must still appear reasonable.  
Unfortunately, democratic governments often do not weigh the options related to these 
demands with due care: Decisions by democratically elected governments to deploy their 
troops are at times based on less than minimal knowledge of the situation on the ground. 
However, such knowledge is indispensable for the rational weighing of the aforemen-
tioned four points. The decision on the war in Iraq was reached without decision-makers 
being aware of the fact that it was the Shiite clerics, Sunni chieftains and remnants of the 
Ba’ath Party, and not the Iraqis in exile, who actually constituted the country’s power 
base. Decision-makers sent troops to Afghanistan, apparently being convinced of the idea 
that the implementation of a modern centralized government would provide a solution 
for a traditionally anti-centralist country, without considering the enormous political 
significance of the clans, valley communities or local tribes. Politicians made use of gross 
exaggerations – such as a comparison of the atrocities in Kosovo with those in Auschwitz 
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(Schröder 2006: 110-1; Fischer 2007: 184-5) – or reached decisions on the basis of ‘group 
think’.7 The American and British governments falsified and lied about information from 
their intelligence services. Soldiers are well aware of the fact that politicians avoid using 
the term ‘war’ in order to make deployments more palatable to their populace, or even to 
more comfortably be able to wile away in their own self-delusion – but the soldiers know 
better. This term-avoidance has the side-effect of sustained minimization of popular in-
terest in troop combat deployment – unless troop casualties or ‘collateral damage’ should 
make the headlines. 
There is an essential piece of evidence annulling the constantly claimed assertion that 
military operations are unavoidable: If the armed forces are sent into a violent conflict 
lacking sufficient manpower and issued unsuitable equipment, it can be deduced that the 
decision-makers who called for involvement have, in fact, granted no significance to na-
tional security or defence. Troops are sent into the field, only to be hastily withdrawn after 
suffering heavy losses, such as was the case in Lebanon in 1983 and again in Somalia in 
1993, seeming to suggest that deployment either lasted too long or was never necessary in 
the first place. They are shipped off to Congo in order to allay post-colonial French con-
cerns – troubled that the Anglophone world in central Africa might be gaining too much 
in influence – by means of EU solidarity. They remain to monitor the successful election 
win of one warlord over another, leaving the country in the same violent state of chaos as 
when they arrived. There quite plainly exists a preference by politics and society to wage 
wars on the side, allowing for involvement only as long as daily life continues on unaf-
fected at home (excluding the bothersome expense): The stress of war is wholly ‘out-
sourced’ to the armed forces. This of course implies that the situation is not as serious as 
the deployment discourse would lead one to believe. 8  
When assessing the actual deployment missions, doubt arises as to the existence of 
necessary due diligence, and, additionally, on account of the limited success of the fun-
damental assignment – the establishment of modern forms of governance in collapsed 
states or following violent conflicts in far-away countries – also raises eyebrows. External 
interference in the inner relations of other societies and regions is an undertaking fraught 
with risk and folly, in which the goals set and the goals reached more often than not di-
verge from one another. Even the most peaceful forms of assistance remain incursions in 
complex networks of social relationships, power structures and communication flows. As 
a general rule, the intervener – whether acting economically, communicatively, or by use 
of police or military forces – has an inadequate understanding of the relations in which he 
is intervening in order to be able to make a reliable prognosis of the intervention’s 
chances for success (Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn 2010). The much-proclaimed concept 
 
 
6  ‘Groupthink’ is defined as a socio-psychological process in which a group of otherwise competent persons 
makes bad or unrealistic decisions on account of the fact that each individual has readjusted their own 
opinion to that of the group’s, assumed, opinion. This can lead to a situation in which the group takes ac-
tion or reaches compromises that would have been rejected by any individual member under normal cir-
cumstances (Janis 1972). 
8  Should suspicions prove true that postal mail to and from soldiers stationed in Afghanistan was systemat-
ically opened, this would be another serious breach of the ‘second social contract’. 
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of ‘local ownership’ can also be interpreted ironically: The local actors end up doing what 
they want with the provided resources and activities stemming from the intervener; the 
new German ‘Progress Report’ on Afghanistan provides illuminating insights into this 
fact. External intentions are frequently not in accordance with local wills – of the relevant 
minorities or, in some cases, majorities. (Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn 2010).  
Interventions come across as less damaging, and therefore more promising, the more 
carefully they are carried out. Soft interventions conform better to the old motto by Karl 
Popper to “do no harm” than do heavy interventions.9 This imperative would result in far 
more diligent and considered scrutiny of policy, both prior to and during any interven-
tions in conflicts, by whatever means, than was the observable case in the past. This would 
also comply precisely to the directives of the ‘second social contract’ in relation to the 
obligation to due diligence owed the populace of a country being intervened in. 
In order to avoid the danger of alienation between society, politics and the armed 
forces, parliaments and governments must approach the decision process on military 
deployments with much more consideration, thoroughness and care than they have in the 
past; a handful of good reasons and vague chances for success are far from sufficient. Rea-
sons for involvement must be grounded on thorough, in-depth assessment of the condi-
tions in the field, as well as a critical analysis of the prospects for success. These must then 
be weighed against the interests of those whom politics has imposed the high personal 
risks involved in the military mission on. It is far more advisable to occasionally say ‘no’ 
to military involvement than to send one’s soldiers into a ‘mission impossible’, even if this 
induces criticism from allied partners or the European Union, and even if, on the surface, 
the deployment seems attractive to politicians. Status considerations, prestige, liberal-
ideological zealousness, alliance pressure, political opportunism or vanity are all poor 
reasons for violating the ‘second social contract’. 
 
 
9  Extreme situations that make military intervention unavoidable do occur. Nevertheless, the question 
remains open as to whether any of the military deployments by Western states in the past twenty years 
have fulfilled this criterion. One case in which the international community answered this question, in 
hindsight, with a ‘yes’ was the case of Rwanda, and there, the intervention was never carried out. 
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